



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

*Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic.* By H. S. MACRAN. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1912.—pp. 315.

This is a translation of the first section of Hegel's *Subjective Logik*, with an Introduction and explanatory notes. The translation occupies the greater portion of the volume (pp. 111-284), and, naturally, is the most important part of the work. The work of translation has been done very well, and will prove to be of service to one who finds the language of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* hopelessly obscure. It must be added, however, that the English dress of Hegel's thought would not have suffered in appearance had italicised words and phrases been used in the translation less frequently. When it happens that thirty-four such words and phrases occur on a single page (this was chosen at random), the monotony of the fashion wears upon the reader; and, really, nothing appears to be accomplished by it.

In the Introduction (pp. 7-106) the author reviews in outline the Hegelian doctrine of thought and its implications. In this review one finds a refreshing force and directness of expression. But whether the writer always remains true to the spirit of his author in his interpretations is a debatable matter. What Hegel really meant by his conception of *pure thought* is a problem of no little difficulty. Professor Macran says he meant by it abstract thought (p. 30), and by abstract thought we are to understand, apparently thought without an object other than itself. We are told that pure thought must not be "confused with our everyday thinking, which is thinking *about something*" (p. 43), the implication being that pure thought is not thought that thinks *about something*. And with this, it would seem, the Hegelian dialectic is once for all enclosed in such a hard shell of abstractness that it finds itself powerless to emerge. Professor Macran himself feels this difficulty when he comes to deal with the *Philosophy of Nature*; he gets himself around this difficulty (not through it) by invoking "some one-sidedness in the nature of thought *as a whole*" (p. 84). This traditional interpretation of the Hegelian doctrine of thought seems to be wholly innocent of the lesson of the *Phenomenologie des Geistes*: the standpoint of what Hegel calls *absolute knowledge* has not come within its ken. At any rate, if Professor Macran's interpretation of Hegel's meaning is the correct one, then it would seem that the Hegelian epistemology must be laid aside as a useless, if indeed gigantic, undertaking: it, then, is just the type of philosophy which Professor Macran deprecates, "the complementary absurdity to vulgar realism, one being a philosophy of thought without things, and the other of things without thought" (p. 82).

This insistence upon the pharisaical purity of thought leads Professor Macran into another position which, to some at least, is questionable. I quote a few of his statements. "The notion of science as having for its function the discovery and exposition of facts is not true of any science that deserves the name" (p. 12). "While the different sciences only oppose the world of facts in particular directions and respects, philosophy opposes it absolutely" (p. 13). "It is not facts then, but this new supersensible world of absolute truth, only to be reached by turning away from the facts, that is

the real object of philosophy" (p. 14). Now if all of this be true, one might appropriately ask whether science and philosophy, especially the latter, are worth the pains. Of course the author does not mean, literally, what he seems to say; if one reads him carefully, one discovers that he is only interpreting the Hegelian view that truth is to be found not in perceptual or factual existence as such, but rather in the existential world when it is interpreted by thought. But his manner of expressing this view is, to say the least, unfortunate; just such expressions have heretofore brought us into endless confusion, and aided not a little in bringing idealism into disrepute. Certainly, the least one could do, if one will write after this fashion, would be to define exactly what is to be understood by a 'fact.' In answer to this criticism, Professor Macran might justify himself by calling attention to what he says later: "A primary fact is the starry heavens as a multitude of twinkling lights out there above me; a scientific fact of physical nature . . . is the astronomical system of celestial bodies" (p. 87). But it is evident that the term 'fact' is used here in two entirely distinct meanings; the author himself immediately urges that "no two representations could be more diverse than those two representations of the stars" (*ibid.*). And it is also evident that, while the science of astronomy denies one of these facts, it as certainly asserts the other. To say that science busies itself with the denial of the fact is not very enlightening unless we are told what a 'fact' is and what its 'denial' involves: the most that can come of this is misunderstanding. And the same holds with double force of philosophy.

The translation of the *Subjective Logic* is followed by a Note on the Contrast between the Hegelian and the Popular Conceptions of Formal Logic (pp. 285-295), and a Note on Hegel's Theory of the Syllogistic Figures (pp. 296-303). The explanatory notes (pp. 304-315) will prove of assistance to one unfamiliar with the Hegelian terminology.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

*Le Génie Littéraire.* Par les Drs. A. RÉMOND, PAUL VOIVENEL. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1912.—pp. 304.

The authors of this work, being specialists in diseases of the mind, have undertaken to prove a sensible thesis (long ago upheld by Charles Lamb), the sanity of true genius. The first chapter is one of general orientation. The next five respectively deal with (Chap. 2) the necessary information on anatomy and physiology, (Chap. 3) the physiology of language, (Chap. 4) genius in music and mathematics, (Chap. 5) verbal and sensory associations, (Chap. 6) attention, dreaming, and inspiration. The body of the work is concerned with anomalies of inspiration—the effect of alcohol, for example, on the productivity of Hoffmann, Poe, and Verlaine; the action of hashish, cocaine, and opium on various writers; the interference of bodily illness, as in Leopardi, and the like. We have here a veritable gallery of literary portraits of diseased and wayward men of the second rank, some of whom might have been of the